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The opinion therefore, though somewhat guarded, would
seem on the whole to adopt the views of the cases refusing
to apply, as an inexorable rule, the "void ab initio" theory
when an office is created by an unconstitutional statute. In
so doing, it is submitted that the Court has followed the
sounder line of authority. 10
THE SEAL AS CONSIDERATION ON A
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
Citizen's Nat. Bank of Pocomoke City v. Custis'
Plaintiff, the payee of a sealed instrument, brought this
action against the defendant bank, the executor of John
T. M. Sturgis, maker of the instrument. The pleader
declared on it as upon a bill obligatory "payable to the
said Bertha D. Custis on demand". The writing proved
to possess all the requirements of negotiability as specified in Art. 13, Sec. 20. The trial court treated the instrument as a specialty and maintained that the seal precluded
a defense on the ground of absence of consideration, and
a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. On appeal, Held:
Reversed and new trial awarded. Since the instrument
was in writing signed by the maker, and contained an unconditional promise to pay to the order of the appellee
a sum certain in money on demand,2 it was a valid and
negotiable promissory note despite the presence of the
seal.3 That the Negotiable Instruments Act4 was within
the contemplation of the parties and was anticipated in
the formation and execution of the instrument could be
inferred from the provision wherein the "maker and endorser" engaged to waive demand, protest and notice of
non-payment.5 The position taken by the trial court was
prejudicial to the appellant as it had apparently accepted
the appellee's argument that, even though without consideration, the instrument was enforceable as a gift. The
Court gave the following clear statement of the Maryland
law as to the effect of a seal as consideration on a negotiable instrument:
" For a penetrating analysis of the question in various aspects, see Field
op. cit supra note 7. particularly Chapter IV.
1 153 Md. 235. 138 Atl. 261, 53 A. L. R. 1165 (1927).
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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"The Negotiable Instruments Act therefore abolishes the conclusive presumption of consideration for
a sealed instrument which is otherwise negotiable, but
gives to every negotiable paper, whether with or without seal, the prima facie presumption that it was issued
for a valuable consideration, and that every person
whose signature appears thereon becomes a party
thereto for value, subject however to the right of the
maker, as against any person not a holder in due
course, to show affirmatively the consideration to be
absent, as in the case of a gift, or to have failed in
whole or in part."
The Maryland view is supported by at least one leading text writer' and the argument is to the effect that as
the N. I. L." operates to convert an instrument otherwise
non-negotiable under the Law Merchant because of the
seal into a negotiable instrument, it follows that such instrument is necessarily subject to other provisions of the
Act which state that "absence or failure of consideration
is a matter of defense as against any person not a holder
in due course," '8 and "In the hands of any holder other
than a holder in due course an instrument is subject to the
same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. "9
At common law a sealed promise or covenant was binding by its own force. Professor Williston condemns 0 the
often used phrases that a seal "imports" consideration,
or that consideration is "presumed" from the seal; he
criticizes such usage as "absurd historically, since sealed
instruments were binding centuries before the development of informal contracts and the law of consideration."
The seal was sufficient in itself where no other consideration was bargained for and no defense could be made on
the ground of the "absence" or "want" thereof, but, where
some other exchange was intended by the parties, the failure to receive the same provided a ground for equitable
relief, although at law failure of consideration was unavailing as a defense. The Court of Appeals recognizes
this distinction in the principal case: "In an action at law
on such a sealed instrument the absence or failure of consideration could not be inquired into, except through a
Lile's note in his edition of Bigelow's Bills and Notes, P. 39.
' Supra note 3.
8 Md. Code, Art. 13, Sec. 47.
* Md. Code, Art. 13, Sec. 77.
10 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.), Sec. 100.
o
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plea by way of equitable defense."" Under the N. I. L.
"the legislative intent was to put negotiable papers whether
sealed or unsealed, on a common substantive and procedural equality, and so to permit this defense of total or partial failure of consideration to be made without reference
to the presence or absence of a seal to an instrument of
writing, if otherwise negotiable."' 2 Today then "every 8
negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been
issued for a valuable consideration; and every person
whose signature appears
thereon to have become a party
4
thereto for value."1
The only other Maryland case wherein the specific question was raised is Dever v. Silver.5 In that case the Court,
holding the burden of proving want of consideration to be
on the payer, said:
"The seal upon the note when considered as a specialty, imports a consideration, and in the absence of
all proof on the part of the obligor of a want of consideration, would, upon such defense, entitle the obligee
to a verdict; and should the note under the Negotiable
Instrument Act of this State be regarded as a negotiable instrument to be treated as such in respect to
the question before us, then it is we think clearly established in this State that under such Act the burden
of proof was on the defendant to show that there was
a failure or want of consideration.""1
The problem does not seem to have been decided in
many jurisdictions but the apparent trend favors the Maryland view.
In Citizens Bank of Blakely v. Hall"' the
Georgia Court said: "A proper construction of the Negotiable Instruments Law, now adopted as a statute in all of
the states, requires the ruling that want of consideration
may be pleaded as a defense in a suit on a sealed promissory note." Similarly, in Cracowaner v. Carlton Nat.
Bank :" "The Negotiable Instruments Act expressly provides that the seal shall not affect either the validity or
the negotiability of the note. Such a note is open to the
1 Supra note 1, 153 Md. 235, 238.
Supra note 1. 153 Md. 235, 242.
"Italics supplied.
"Md. Code. Art. 13, Sec. 43.
15135 Md. 355, 109 Ati. 67 (1919).
16 Ibid, 135 Md. 355, 362.
153 A. L. R. 1173, 97 A. L. R. 617.
1 179 Ga. 662, 177 S. E. 496, 499 (1934).
1998 Fla. 792, 124 So. 275, 276 (1929).
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defense of want of consideration.... All of the common-law
distinctions between an unsealed note and a note under
seal or a bill single are gone." Connecticut 20 concurs with
Maryland, Georgia and Florida: ". . . an instrument
(Sealed) . . . is a negotiable promissory note, and . . .
is open to the defense of want of consideration." Pennsylvania, in Balliet v. Fetter,21 reached an opposite conclusion, reasoning that merely because the N. I. L. provides
that an instrument under seal may be negotiable, it did not
destroy the significance thereof. The Court consequently
refused to "sweep aside the principle enumerated in this
long line of cases" that a seal was not merely presumptive
evidence of consideration but actually imports consideration. In Homer Building and Loan Assoc. v. Noble2 2 the
Court said: "In Pennsylvania a seal is more than mere
presumptive evidence of consideration. It imports consideration and therefore want of consideration is no defense
to an action on a sealed instrument." Delaware 23 may follow the Pennsylvania view, but as pointed out in the principal case, the decision was made at nisi prius in an oral
instruction to the jury without any citation of authority,
so it should not be accorded the weight of a judgment by
an appellate tribunal.
If the policy of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to
facilitate the negotiation of negotiable papeT, it is possible
to argue that the Pennsylvania view is preferable in that
a prospective purchaser of sealed paper would feel less
hesitancy in buying paper on which the defense of want
of consideration could not be made. Even though the
presence or absence of consideration is of no concern where
holders in due course are involved, it may be that the extrinsic policy of encouraging the negotiation of commercial
paper, and of increasing the number of dealings therein in
order to provide a larger volume of transactions in money
and credit, is best served by sustaining the potency of the
seal even as between parties with notice. The Maryland
view however, has a certain symmetry and it may be logical to say that, if the Act operates to impart negotiability
to a sealed instrument, such instrument becomes thereby
subject to the control of the other sections of the N. I. L.
so that the defense of want of consideration is available
as against a party not a holder in due course. But if the
20

St. Paul's Episcopal Church v. Fields, 81 Conn. 670, 72 Atl. 145 (1909).

21314 Pa. 284, 171 At. 466 (1934).

181 Atl. 848 (Pa. 1935).
18Kennedy v. Collins, 30 Del. 24G, 108 Atl. 48 (1919).
22
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seal is held to be of no significance as far as consideration
is concerned, consistency would seem to require that it
be deemed ineffectual to prolong the period of limitations.
The Courts do not go to this length2 4 and they hold, as in
the principal case, 2 that as the statute of limitations has
no effect on the validity or negotiable character of an instrument, its execution with a seal continues to make applicable the twelve year period of limitations.

COMPROMISING OF CLAIM BY EXECUTOR OR
ADMINISTRATOR WITHOUT APPROVAL
OF ORPHANS' COURT
Blum v. Fox1
In this case substituted administrators excepted to the
allowance of the administrator's account with reference to
an item for the payment of a claim to a person for alleged
services rendered to the intestate. The intestate, prior to
her death, expressed her desire that all her property be
given to said person, who had befriended her for a number of years, nursed her during illness, and provided her
with shelter and home. Though no testimony was taken
in the Orphans' Court, the inference may be made that the
amount paid by the removed administrator was in compromise settlement of a larger demand. The exceptants
base their objections to the claim on the ground that it
was in payment of an unliquidated claim for alleged services to the decedent which was without merit and was not
due and owing to the claimant. They further charge that
"97 A. L. R. 617, 620.
Supra note 1, 153 Md. 2.35, 241. The Court also considered an interesting point of pleading, supra note 1, 153 Md. 235, 244. Since the declaration referred to an instrument under seal "payable to Bertha D. Custis"
rather than "payable to the order of Bertha D. Custis," it alleged a "nonnegotiable single bill." According to the Court, the general issue pleas of
non a8sump8it and nil debet were inapplicable to this declaration and were
demurrable; the correct plea should have been non est factum, i. e., the
general issue plea suited to an action of debt upon a specialty. This is
correct as a statement of the common law rules of pleading, but in 1918
the General Assembly amended Md. Code, Art. 75, Sec. 4, so as to abolish
the action of debt and extend the action of assumpsit to cover all actions
er contractu on sealed as well as unsealed instruments; and further to
make non assumpsit and nil debet the proper general issue pleas in all
such actions. Apparently the Court overlooked this statute. See 1 Poe,
Pleading and Practice (Tiffany's Ed.) 649, note.
21
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197 Atl. 117 (Md. 1938).

